Recent years have seen several proposals for the use of economic mechanisms to allocate grid resources with a special emphasis on scheduling. While this is an important operational issue, the focus of this literature has assumed that capacity (of CPU, bandwidth, storage and software licenses) on the grid exists and that resource requirements for jobs being submitted can be estimated quite accurately a priori. However, both these assumptions are unrealistic and can create challenges in grid marketplace design. For example, the social welfare that obtains in a grid environment with uncoordinated distributed planning for resource provisioning can be lower than that under centralized coordinated planning. In this paper, we provide an overview of some of these challenges and propose some techniques from Management Science that may be applicable to these problems.
Introduction
A key trend in computing today is service-oriented computing, which is driven by distributed computing technologies such as grid computing. Grid computing refers to the sharing of computing resources such as CPU (processing) cycles among a set of distributed computers.
Formally, a grid is a type of parallel and distributed system that enables the sharing, selection, and aggregation of geographically distributed "autonomous" resources dynamically at runtime depending on their availability, capability, performance, cost, and user preferences.
2 A well known example of a grid computing project is UC Berkeley's SETI@Home screensaver which allowed Barkeley's SETI project to tap into spare computing power available on millions of PCs that had the screensaver installed. Similarly, Intel's NetBatch Grid project allows the firm to process engineering simulation jobs by using spare computing power available in Intel's various offices. Intel estimates that NetBatch has saved the firm $500M over 10 years and increased computer utilization from 35% to 80% over the same period. 3 Grid computing offers great benefits in solving computationally complex problems related to financial modeling, weather prediction and molecular modeling for biotech applications. As a result, there has been considerable focus recently on the design of grid marketplaces.
Several firms including Sun and IBM have expended considerable resources in trying to establish themselves as primary resource providers in grid markets. Sun Microsystems recently launched the Sun Grid where users can submit large jobs and are charged $1 per CPU hour. IBM, which runs three grid centers in the US and one in France, currently charges $0.47 per CPU hour.
Initiatives by these large firms are making grid marketplaces a reality.
Since grids can be highly distributed and often function without any central planner, it is important to design market mechanisms that can help produce desirable behavior from each independent decision-making entity in a grid. In this paper, we cover some of the key challenges associated with the design of a grid marketplace. Specifically, we will focus on two issues -i)
Determining the cost of distributed coordination in grids. ii) Obtaining accurate estimates of resource requirements for submitted jobs.
In this paper, we will provide an overview of these two challenges and discuss prior work in Management Science that is of relevance in addressing many of these challenges. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature on grid marketplaces. In Section 3, we discuss each of the aforementioned challenges associated with the design of grid markets. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
Literature Review
A primary area of focus in grid economics is related to resource allocation. This stream of work studies the use of market mechanisms to allocate computing cycles to incoming jobs. For example, Feldman et al (2005) formulate a resource allocation game and study the efficiency and fairness of the Nash equilibria that results. Wellman et al (2001) propose an auction mechanism to allocate distributed resources to users. Other work on market-based resource allocation includes those by Wolski et al (2001) , Waldspurger et al (1992) , Buyya and Vazhkudai (2001) and Buyya (2002) . Market-based resource allocation has also been implemented in the Tycoon system (Lai et al 2004) .
Challenges in Design of Grid Markets
Grid systems are distributed systems with a number of independent actors that coordinate through a market mechanism. It is important to design market mechanisms in a manner that ensures socially desirable and efficient outcomes are achieved. Below, we review two challenges related to the cost of decentralized coordination and incorrect a priori estimates of resource requirements for jobs submitted to grids.
Capacity Planning and the Cost of Decentralized Coordination
Distributed systems offer a number of advantages, including scalability and network resilience. However, because control is distributed as well, each of the distributed agents acts (semi) autonomously. Relative to centralized coordination, some efficiency is lost because of this lack of control. It is important to measure this cost and explore approaches to reduce high costs of decentralization.
An interesting issue in this context relates to capacity planning that occurs in a grid environment. In prior studies, researchers have studied resource allocation, scheduling and pricing assuming that capacity already exists in the grid and that and the investments in capacity is independent of the underlying business/economic model in place.. However, capacity choices are made by strategic independent nodes based on knowledge of job arrival, payments and capacity choices of other nodes. We plan to study capacity choices with decentralized decisionmaking and contrast that with capacity choices under coordinated central planning. Specifically, we are interested in the difference in social welfare that obtains in a distributed grid environment with coordinated central planning for resource provisioning versus an environment in which capacity planning is done by autonomous players. To motivate the problem further, we provide a brief formulation of the problem below.
We will begin with an abstraction of an intra-organizational grid such as that in Intel.
Consider a simple grid system with just two nodes. Jobs arrive at a node and may be serviced locally at that node or forwarded to the other node if the local node is congested but other node is free. Assume that each job is completely serviced at one node (i.e., we will tentatively ignore workflows wherein jobs are divided into a sequence of subtasks). A payment mechanism is in place so that a node gets compensated when it services jobs forwarded to it. Job arrival follows a stochastic process with known mean and standard deviation (for e.g., a Poisson process). Each node independently determines its own processing capacity based on arrival rate of jobs, cost of capacity and payments for processing grid jobs. The submitter of the job ultimately cares about the delay in processing the jobs (not just whether the jobs are processed or not). Thus, we assume that the utility is a function of the average delay. 
is the expected delay in a queuing system wherein jobs arrive at and are serviced by node
) is the utility associated with the expected delay. Node 2 solves a similar optimization problem to compute the optimal capacity 2 µ . With no coordination among the nodes, efficiency may be lost. However, a central planner can account for the job-arrival process at both nodes and the scheduling algorithm used to forward the jobs to a given node to determine the optimal capacity of the two nodes.
By appropriately modeling the queuing system described in Figure 1 , the welfare maximizing optimization problem can be formulated. This will require us to compute ) , ( Pr 1 1 1 µ µ , the steady-state probability that a request is forwarded to node 1 given the capacity of the two nodes. Similarly, ) , (
, the expected delay in the queuing system will have to be determined.
The rich stream of work in queuing including that on multiserver queues is relevant here. These queuing models have been applied to problems of distributed capacity determination in supply chains. Similar models that have been formulated keeping the grid context in mind will help shed light on distributed capacity provisioning and the cost of decentralization.
Estimating Resource Requirements for Jobs
A number of resource scheduling approaches have been proposed in the literature including the Tycoon (Lai et al 2004) and Condor system (Thain et al 2003) . Most current systems assume that resource requirements can be estimated a priori by the users. The scheduling systems perform a matchmaking function by matching jobs to resources based on resource requirements and available resources. However, a number of empirical studies have found that users provide very inaccurate estimates of resources required and job runtime (Mu'alem and Feitelson 2001; Tsafrir et al 2005) . These poor estimates continue to be provided by users even when there are strong incentives for truthful reporting. For example, scheduling techniques like backfilling (Mu'alem and Feitelson 2001) schedule the first job in the queue that can be completed given the available resources, thus providing incentives to quote low runtime requirements. Simultaneously, jobs may be killed if the actual runtime is greater than the estimate ensuring that users do not quote low resource and runtime estimates. The inaccuracies in the estimates despite these incentive mechanisms suggest that a fundamental problem is that it is inherently hard for users to estimate resource requirements.
Poor estimates of resource requirements can significantly undermine the efficiency of the scheduling algorithms. Further, job submitters will estimate their costs based on these resource requirement estimates and known pricing policies. Thus, the realized costs may be considerably different from their estimates, causing considerable ex-post regret when costs exceed expectations. This is also not desirable. Solutions are needed to address inefficiencies caused poor estimates of resource requirements so that buyers can better estimate costs, schedulers can better assign jobs to resources and resource providers can better plan their capacity decisions.
There has been very limited work on addressing these issues. We propose two approaches that researchers and practitioners may adopt to address the problem. The first is to improve the quality of decision support tools provided to job submitters. By analyzing past data on realized completion times of jobs along with job characteristics, it may be possible to better predict the completion time when a new job arrives. A number of machine learning techniques may be applied to learn these prediction rules.
Another interesting approach may be use risk pooling along with an appropriate pricing mechanism. The fundamental idea behind risk pooling is to send heterogeneous jobs to resource providers. Even though there may be considerable variance in resource requirements of individual jobs, the variance in resource requirement of a set of independent jobs would be considerably lower. This follows from the law of large numbers and is a fundamental application of statistical multiplexing. The reduced variation in the pooled jobs allows the provider to better estimate the total resource requirements and hence to plan capacity. Risk pooling has been applied in various domains such as supply procurement and content delivery (Hosanagar et al 2005) . The fundamental idea behind risk pooling in Content Delivery Networks (CDN) is that even though there can be considerable variation in demand for individual content provider's content, the variance in the demand for a pooled set of content providers is lower. Thus, a CDN can sign on a large number of heterogeneous content providers as customers. It can then plan capacity based on the pooled demand that has low variance, and can thus lower costs and eliminate the loss of requests. Similarly, risk pooling in a grid setting can be accomplished by the use of a scheduling policy that sends a diverse set of jobs to a resource. This in turn can improve capacity planning by providers in a grid.
In order to mitigate the user's risk of highly variable costs, pricing schemes from content delivery domain may also be applied. For example, percentile-based pricing schemes (Hosanagar et al 2004) are employed in content delivery wherein content providers are charged based on the 95 th percentile of the demand. This allows the CDN to charge a higher price to content providers with high mean and/or high variance in demand. At the same time, if the demand distribution is known, the 95 th percentile and hence the expected price may be easily computed. This is better than charging for the realized demand as the percentile-based price is more predictable and achieves the objectives of the pricing policy. Similarly, grids may be charge users based on the 90 th /95 th percentile of resources consumed. Thus, even though the exact resource requirement of an individual job cannot be estimated a priori, the 95 th percentile can be predicted when the overall distribution is known. The distribution can be calibrated from the realized resource requirements of past jobs. As a consequence, prices are predictable and stable, thus eliminated user regret from variable bills.
Conclusions
The design of grid marketplaces poses challenges, such as the cost of decentralization and the intrinsic difficulty of estimating resource requirements for jobs. Although these issues are unique in many ways, the study of these challenges can benefit from work in Management Science. This includes work on capacity provisioning in supply chains, queuing systems, capacity provisioning and pricing in content delivery, mechanism design among others. Collaboration between researchers from the two areas holds much promise.
